This paper examines how the call for better coordination of external resources arose, through discourse on the effectiveness of aid and 'good government', and, drawing on the case studies, describes some of the different coordination mechanisms that have been used to coordinate aid in the health sector.
Introduction
Coordination of external resources to the health sector has become central to the aid agenda in many countries. Attention was initially given to coordination in the 1980s, as the volume, diversity, and entry of new donor agencies active in the health sectors of developing countries increased (Buse & Walt, 1997) . The recognition that this trend often led to an unmanageable proliferation of projects, policies, and 'an unruly melange' of demands on health ministries, provided impetus to find mechanisms to coordinate such external resources. For governments, improving the coherence and coordination of aid was viewed as a way of enhancing donor contributions and ensuring their use for national goals. For donors, coordination offered the potential to ensure more effective use of their resources.
However, while the concept of coordination holds considerable intuitive force, and the idea of coordinating aid is widely promoted, 1 interest in coordination has been expressed largely by donors and much less by recipients. Indeed, whilst the views of recipients are rarely voiced, they tend to be sceptical about the desirability of coordination, given obstacles such as differing political agendas, asymmetrical power relations as well as the fear that coordination may diminish opportunities for personal advancement through the aid regime (Buse, 1999) .
Furthermore, while aid and its coordination has been the subject of much research in the policy and academic communities (Cassen, 1986; Kjellstrom & d'Almieda, 1986; Lipton, 1986; Van Arkadie, 1986; Mingst, 1987; Barry, 1988; Clift, 1988; Whittington & Calhoun, 1988; Ross, 1990; Diallo et al., 1991; Jonsson, 1993; COWIConsult, 1994; Nolke, 1992) , little attention has been given to its role in the health sector (Buse & Walt, 1997) . This special issue of Health Policy and Planning seeks to redress that imbalance, by tracing changes in relations and practices between donors and ministries of health with regard to aid in the health sector and by giving greater voice to countries through a series of case studies. The work presented in this issue is the result of research supported by a number of different agencies, 2 none of which are responsible for the results and views expressed. The investigations on which the case studies are based were embarked upon in 1997, when ideas about sector-wide approaches to managing aid were still incipient, and much has changed in all the case study countries since. For details on research objectives, methods and process see Walt et al. (1998) , Lanjouw et al. (1998) , and Buse (1999) .
The paper ends by suggesting that experience and analysis of different coordination mechanisms, and a greater recognition of the effect of the policy environment on coordination, has shifted the focus of interest away from coordination of aid inputs per se, to a concern about the management of processes through which domestic and external resources are deployed.
The case studies that follow review different countries' experiences with external resources in the health sector in the low-income, high aid-dependent countries of Bangladesh, 'post'-conflict Cambodia, Mozambique, and Zambia, ending with South Africa, comparatively well-off and independent of donors. The last paper reviews the experiences from all these countries, and evidence from elsewhere, and asks what lessons emerge from these cases, particularly with respect to management of the sector as a whole, and how far they may inform the current impetus for sector-wide approaches (SWAps) for managing aid.
Background: the role of aid and its coordination
Following the peak in aid flows attained during the 1980s, aid is declining world-wide and its effectiveness is being questioned in donor countries. In terms of total flows, global aid fell from $62 billion to $55.1 billion between 1992 and 1996 (Aidwatch, 1997) and has fallen further since, although SubSaharan Africa has fared comparatively well in an environment of increasing aid scarcity. By the early 1990s aid amounted to over 10% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Sub-Saharan Africa, and more than 20% of GDP in 10 countries (van de Walle & Johnston, 1996) . However, even the Nordic countries, which historically have been committed to high levels of aid to Africa, are introducing budget cuts in foreign assistance in response to domestic pressures (Landsberg & Kabemba, 1997) . Low-income countries have also suffered because aid flows in the late 1980s and 1990s shifted towards short-term emergency relief efforts, away from longer-term development programmes, although this pattern may now be changing again. OECD figures indicate a 20% reduction in non-food emergency aid between (ODI, 1998 .
It is difficult to assess whether aid to the health sector is also declining because World Bank lending for health increased significantly in the 1990s, and extra funds have been directed towards specific problems such as AIDS, tuberculosis, polio eradication and malaria. However, given aid trends, it is likely that bilateral aid for health is at least stagnant and likely to decline in the future.
Yet, while aid may be decreasing, the proliferation of agencies supporting health projects and programmes does not appear to be diminishing, and so coordinating their inputs remains a concern. Not only have more multilaterals become involved in the health sector (Lee et al. 1996) , and the number of non-government organizations (NGOs) increased, but in the past decade private sector partnerships have become part of the health landscape (Kickbusch & Quick, 1998) .
There are also other more general reasons for supporting the impetus towards more comprehensive and coherent approaches to coordinating and managing resources in the health sector. Health needs are increasing, as populations expand and age; widespread poverty continues to take its toll on health, and increasing inequalities within and between countries are of growing concern. Conflicts continue to disrupt civil life, and emerging diseases challenge already weak health services. Furthermore, the demise of central planning models and the thrust towards decentralization boost the complexity of the health sector. A plurality of actors (internal and external) are expected to play a role in the financing and delivery of health services. Thus, aid coordination is not only desirable in an era of acknowledged 'aid fatigue', but crucial to the effective functioning of the health sector. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that some countries will remain highly dependent on aid. Donors are progressively accepting this reality, and beginning to assume that aid is not short-term transitional support. More stable and binding arrangements are therefore viewed as necessary to ensure and stabilize external support, and guarantee smooth and effective transactions between donors and recipients. Against this picture, innovative approaches to aid coordination are being introduced, and coordination is now high on the agenda of many agencies.
Coordination as a response to perceptions of aid ineffectiveness
Both multilateral and bilateral organizations have long been interested in what the benefits were to recipients of the grants and loans they dispensed to poor countries. In 1974 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund established a joint committee, informally called the Development Committee, to advise on issues to do with resource transfers (Lipton & Toye, 1990) . One of their activities resulted in Cassen's Does Aid Work? (1986) , which assessed the value of development assistance and drew attention to the need for more coordination among donors in any one country. In turn, as a result of its assessments of official development assistance, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD developed principles and guidelines for improving the coordination of foreign resources in the early 1990s (OECD, 1992) . Much of the academic literature of the 1980s and early 1990s, often resulting from analysis of particular bilateral and multilateral activities in low-income countries, concluded that aid did not always achieve its goals, in part, because of the lack of coordination between donors and between donors and recipients (see Buse & Walt 1997 for a review of this literature).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the questions asked by policymakers and scholars were more about what aid achieved, or who benefited from aid, rather than how aid was given (through what instruments, or through what processes). Concerns about beneficiaries and effectiveness were reflected in publications that questioned aid from both a right and a left ideological perspective (Bauer, 1981 as an example of the former; Hayter & Watson, 1985 an example of the latter), or from empirical observation of the activities of multi-and bi-lateral agencies. For example Hancock's Lords of Poverty (1989) was savage in its rejection of the 'rich and powerful bureaucracies that have hijacked our kindness' and his conclusion was that 'aid is not help'. Others concluded differently, arguing that while much aid was irrelevant to the needs of the poor, it was possible to redirect it to more appropriate ends (Independent Group on British Aid, 1986) . A number of scholarly evaluations of the effectiveness of aid suggested that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate definitively the positive or negative effects of aid on development (Riddell, 1987; Mosley et al., 1991) .
By the 1990s, fundamental questions were also being raised about conventional wisdom in the development theories that informed development assistance. Gwin (1997) , for example, quotes two studies which questioned neo-liberal development theories. The first, by Bruno et al. (1996) , suggested that macro-economic policies which aimed at reducing inequalities -by facilitating the accumulation of productive assets by the poor for example -were not necessarily at the expense of economic growth, but could in fact enhance growth. The second study, by Burnside and Dollar (1996) , suggested that the evidence for the impact of aid on development -for good or bad -was limited, and that what was important was the policy environment in which aid was implemented. The implication from both studies was that as a diverse range of factors influence development (and different factors in different settings), unravelling the effects of non-aid influences from aid is a sterile exercise. Gwin (1997) concluded that aid could only be effective in a 'good' policy environment, and that, in such an environment, aid enhances the prospects for growth. Nonetheless, only very recently has there been much consideration of 'how' aid is given (see, for example, the 1998 World Bank publication, Assessing Aid: what works, what doesn't and why), which appears to be equally important to understanding why aid is or is not effective.
Good government, the policy environment and the effective use of aid
In the 1980s, within the intense contemporary discourse taking place on the role of the state, aid became increasingly conditional on economic and political restructuring, as the pendulum swung first against the state, then more recently towards a diminished but 'capable' state (World Bank, 1997) . Central to these discussions were the notions of good government, implying greater attention to procedural and regulatory issues of accountability, transparency, participation and the rule of law (Healey & Robinson, 1992) . Particular attention was focused on the systems governments had developed to identify problems and to formulate and implement policies, as these were identified as the critical mechanisms through which 'good governance' is exercised. Since the management and organization of such systems depended on the actors within them -whether bureaucrats, politicians, or technical managers -attention also turned to the main actors in the policy process. The policy environment is thus defined as the interaction between what Hildebrand and Grindle (1997) refer to as the five dimensions of capacity within the state and the actors (individuals or institutions) who undertake tasks related to problem identification, policy formulation, policy implementation and evaluation. The five dimensions are:
• the action environment, which 'sets the economic, political and social milieux in which governments carry out their activities'; • the institutional context of the public sector, which includes factors such as rules, procedures, financial resources; • the task network, which is the 'set of organizations involved in accomplishing any given task' -in the case of aid coordination in the health sector, the task network might include the Ministry of Health, and a number of different officials within it, oversight ministries and the donors (including non-government organizations); • organizations, 'the building blocks' of the task networkthe way individuals work within them depends on the hierarchy and authority, incentive structures, management styles and so on; • human resources, which in this case are concerned with the level of qualification and education of personnel in the government departments and donor agencies, their training, career possibilities and remuneration, all of which may affect their professional attitudes and work ethic.
While there is no one definition of what constitutes a 'good' policy environment, it could be assumed to reflect the governance parameters of accountability, transparency, dependence on the rule of law and adherence to procedures and processes. It would include participation through partnership, investment in people and for some, competition (World Bank, 1997) . By the end of the 1990s it was increasingly asserted that aid would only be effective in policy environments which displayed some of the above characteristics: 'when donorfinanced projects fail, it is often because of weak institutions and public organizations' (World Bank, 1998; 89) .
The focus on good government, capable states and the wave of 'health sector reform' which swept most countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Mills, 1999) has led to considerable emphasis being placed on systemic reforms in many countries. Among other things, reforms have addressed changes within the civil service relating to the size of the bureaucracy, recruitment and promotion policies, and conditions of service, and also to changes in policy-making procedures at executive level, for example in Cabinet (Garnett et al., 1997) . Within the health sector, the policy environment has been affected not only by broader public sector reform, but also by a series of specific reforms which have typically included reorganization of the ministry so as to reflect its changed and often circumscribed role, the broadening of financing options and liberalization of the private sector, among others (Mills & Zwi, 1995) .
While such changes have potentially opened up the policy environment to many new actors, and introduced a range of new policies and procedures, reforms have put huge pressures on recipient governments, and responses have differed. Zambia, for example, embraced reforms wholeheartedly, and enjoyed positive relations with donors at least until 1998. Others became cautious reformers as they achieved stability or peace after years of disruption, as the case study on Mozambique shows. Malawi was extremely slow to take up reforms (Mvula & Munthali, 1997) and Tanzania has been likened to a driver implementing reforms with one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake (Pavignani, 1999) . In many countries, reform has been accompanied by disruption, dysfunction and discomfort, and in some, resistance resulting in considerable paralysis.
Shifting from 'aid coordination' to 'systems of resource management'
In the 1980s, as many highly aid-dependent countries struggled to manage the influx of donors, large numbers of projects and considerable duplication of activities, it was relatively easy to suggest that what was perceived as the ineffective use of external resources was due to a lack of coordination.
To say that a policy, programme or project is uncoordinated means in a general sense that its elements are somehow incongruent, they do not interact smoothly to produce desired elements, and/or that the links between them create excessive friction or conflict. . . (Brinkerhoff, 1996) Experience showed that donors supported different treatment regimes, whether for tuberculosis (Fryatt, 1995) or oral rehydration solutions (Walt, 1994) ; established parallel systems (Kanji, 1992) ; exacerbated inequalities through supporting urban projects or particular regions in a country (Pavignani & Durão, 1997) . The conventional antidote to this lack of coordination was to create mechanisms that would bring together this 'unruly melange' of donors and projects, and a number of principles to guide coordination efforts were agreed by international agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP and the members of the OECD (OECD, 1992) . Extrapolated to the health sector, these principles included leadership by the Ministry of Health (MoH), and adherence by bilateral and multilateral donors to a national plan and national priorities.
Coordination mechanisms
Before looking at the different mechanisms for coordination used by different countries, it is useful to distinguish between the different forms of aid (Cassels, 1996) . Two broad categories of aid have been identified: programme and project assistance.
Programme aid (also known as budget support) is a generic term encompassing foreign exchange, import credits, commodities or food, which are provided by donors to recipient governments to be sold by them to generate local currency which can be used to support general expenditure or spending by a specific ministry. Programme aid is, by its nature, fungible and so can be used flexibly by the treasury, for example allowing it to subsidize activities of its choice. One result of an increase in programme aid has been a parallel increase in conditionality to address fungibility, as donors have grown concerned that aid might not be used to support those goals and activities which are seen as a priority by the donors. 3 An important feature of programme aid is that it is disbursed through the government's budgets. Thus the issue of coordination of programme aid does not arise, as it is by definition integrated into the recipient's public expenditure programme (hence the term budget support).
In contrast, project aid is earmarked for specific purposes and often involves setting up semi-autonomous cost centres, sometimes managed by donors. At the central level, project aid reflects donors' interests in having a stake in specific activities, and policy action is more concrete, sector-based and focused. Project aid is usually fragmented in a variety of schemes, and so, in the health sector would be mostly managed directly by health authorities. It includes supplies, grants for specific activities, and also technical assistance. The latter may be long term -with physicians, planners, epidemiologists, and so on, working with cadres of the MoH at national and provincial level -or may include short-term consultants. Because of its comparative inefficiency and disruptive potential on the recipient's management systems, project aid has generated widespread concerns on both sides of the aid partnership. It is in this area where serious efforts to coordinate external support have been made. This paper focuses on the mechanisms used in the coordination of project aid. 4 However, two caveats need to be taken into account. First, while NGOs play an important part in development, are often vehicles for project aid, and are active in most low-income countries, the proportion of aid they bring is comparatively small. They have therefore not been the subject of this paper, and the case studies which follow have not, on the whole, referred much to NGOs, except for Cambodia. Second, this paper has not highlighted the role of humanitarian aid, which is subject to special problems of coordination, and is affected by acute and emergency situations as well as, often, weak or absent national authorities. However, the case study on Cambodia redresses this weakness to some extent, by giving an account of aid coordination in conditions of 'post' conflict between 1991 and 1993.
A broad range of mechanisms is used to coordinate or manage aid, and countries develop multiple instruments over time. This wealth of options is presented in Table 1 for a selection of countries.
It is quite common to find that the ministry of health has established a special unit for the coordination of external resources. Unfortunately, they are seldom considered particularly effective, and this was certainly the case in the three countries of our sample where they were found. This may be due to the difficulties in managing a large and disparate array of donor agencies and NGOs, and their multiple actions, which the coordinating units do not always know about, or find difficult to control. In South Africa it was also a function of the limited responsibilities given to the unit at the time of the study. The effectiveness of these units may also be undermined by internal competition inside the MoH: for example, managers of specific projects may prefer to retain personal contacts with 'their' donors. Donors often want to negotiate and liaise with the top hierarchy, and will often bypass coordination units which tend to be perceived as having relatively low status within the MoH. This appeared to be the case in the MoH departments responsible for coordinating aid in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Togo and Senegal, where irregular meetings, changes in leadership, and poor record and minute keeping were the norm (Brown et al., 1998) . The problems faced by aid coordination units are likely exacerbated by the fact that donors are often wary of being subjected to government control.
Geographical zoning relates to a range of specific agreements between donors and recipients, where an agency concentrates its inputs in a given area, such as a province, and may be accorded by government the authority to provide some form of leadership to other donors present. Usually the support provided is wide-ranging, and an agency may even provide resources for most or all components of health care in the identified geographic area. In some cases, health activities are sub-components of broader projects also covering other sectors, such as education or agriculture. Frequently, the supporting agency ends up as the largest in that area. Despite the widespread criticism received by this approach (often dubbed as 'balkanisation'), it is quite popular with both donors and MoH, and occurs in many of the case studies that follow. From the local point of view, these mechanisms are often successful in boosting coordination at the provincial level. The price to be paid may be that coordinated action at national level is undermined, the distribution of resources is skewed to areas favoured by donors rather than by recipients, and local officials are disempowered by the presence of a large and well-resourced team of expatriates who usurp them of key responsibilities (as the case of Mozambique suggests).
Groups of donor agencies exist in all countries. They serve as venues for information sharing, and sometimes, for agreement on some aspects of policy, such as levels of per diems. These mechanisms are often loose, not binding participants to agree to or behave according to a given decision. Some agencies may perceive themselves to be 'like-minded' 5 in their approaches and relationships to the government, and on this basis may form special smaller groups. Sometimes groups are generic, that is, they address the entire health sector. More often they are thematic, and include officials (sometimes, but not often health professionals) involved in, say, mother and child health or human resources.
The benefits and potential problems associated with donoronly groups are exemplified by the World Bank-led consortium in Bangladesh (Buse and Gwin, 1998) . While the consortium represents a remarkably long-lived effort on the part of a number of agencies to accommodate differences in policy and operational practices so as to improve the coordination of a portion of their aid to the sector, it remains an imperfect tool for aid coordination. In 1997, for example, less than a third of the multilateral and bilateral donors active in the sector (nine out of 31) participated and, as a result, only approximately 35% of health aid was channelled though this mechanism. Moreover, the project support office (consisting of 11 professional staff in 1997) usurped critical tasks of the ministry, the policy of holding meetings without government representation aroused suspicion and resentment on the part of government officials, and the very existence of such a large coordination apparatus may have undermined the impetus to establish a government-led consultation mechanism (as it would have been relegated to marginal or ceremonial status given that key decisions were being taken in the donor-only forum).
A formal, government nominated, lead donor agency is a relatively rare way of coordinating and managing aid, and the only example in this issue is that of Mozambique, although one bilateral agency is perceived to be the lead donor in Tanzania (Lucas et al., 1997) . It arose out of a special relationship which developed between the MoH and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), and was strengthened by the latter's decision to provide the MoH with earmarked budget support at a time when many donors were by-passing the ministry in favour of NGOs. In 1992, the MoH asked SDC to facilitate the dialogue between it and the donor community in order to support and coordinate activities. It has not always been easy to sustain the relationship, however, and tensions have arisen between the lead agency and other donors and SDC and the MoH at different points of time (Pavignani & Durão, this issue) . It may be the case that there are few examples of one lead donor coordinating all donors across the entire sector, because few donors can command sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the other donors to assume such a role.
There are other examples where a given agency has taken special responsibility in a specific sub-sector, such as drugs or training. Lead agencies may in these cases be chosen by the donor community, because of their perceived strength or perceived representativeness. Finally, agencies may in fact be leading the process of coordination in some countries, without the formal recognition of the government. This seemed to be the case in Malawi in 1997, where the World Bank brought together the different donors to promote some coordination of initiatives in the health sector (Mvula & Munthali, 1997) .
Regular collective consultations between recipients and donors are sometimes held, but less frequently than might be expected. They tend to be major, formal and relatively ceremonial events, absorbing considerable energy, particularly during their preparation. The wide audience present may limit effective discussion. Although such consultations have generally been useful in encouraging communication between the two sides of the aid relationship, maintaining regularity and sustaining interest has proved difficult in most settings. In Mozambique, for example, the most influential donors deserted the process in favour of attending donor-only meetings. The case study on Zambia suggests that the biannual meetings to plan ahead and review progress are perceived to be successful and joint government-donor annual reviews and planning exercises are envisioned as a component of the SWAp process. The CoCom monthly meetings established in Cambodia in the early 1990s have continued to be well attended, although they serve now more for information sharing than coordination (Hawken, 1999) .
Comprehensive strategies, plans and expenditure programmes, when convincing and consistently developed and acted upon, represent the quintessential foundations of effective management of aid (WHO, 1994) . However, to date, many developing countries still have not prepared comprehensive health policy frameworks nor budgets that reflect articulated priorities (Cassels & Janovsky, 1998) . During the 1990s a few countries, often as a result of negotiations for a World Bank loan, prepared more sophisticated, thorough, and realistic plans and expenditure programmes than the typical five and ten year plans common during the 1970s. These take centre-stage in the programme of work outlined for the SWAp (Cassels, 1997) . The most successful examples, such as in Zambia and Ghana, have involved the donor community early in the conceptualization and development of strategies. Conversely, when a plan is perceived as too influenced by a single agency, it may be dismissed by the other donors, despite its merits. This was the case of one World Bank-sponsored Sector Investment Programme (SIP) in Mozambique (Pavignani & Durão, 1997) and similarly affected, to some extent, the manner in which the Health and Population Sector Strategy of 1997 was received in Bangladesh (Buse & Gwin, 1998) .
Earmarked budget support, pooling and 'basket' arrangements all have in common the management of external funds by recipient authorities (i.e. funds are disbursed through the government budget and accounted for using government systems). Funding agencies negotiate objectives and modalities of financing, but are not involved in implementation. Sometimes a joint steering committee is in charge of allocating and overseeing funds, and setting standards. These approaches have been in place in Zambia and Mozambique for some years, with perceived success. However, none of them has expanded to become comprehensive. For instance, the Zambian basket in 1997 was supported by only five donors and covered only PHC services at district level, excluding salaries and drugs. In 1998 funds channelled through the basket were expected to account for 15% of planned donor expenditure in the health sector (Lake & Musumali, this issue). The Mozambican earmarked budget support is broader in its aims, covering many recurrent expenditure lines, including hospital items. It is, however, provided by different agencies, each requiring slightly different procedures and, as is the case with Zambia, accounts for only a small percentage of aid in the sector (i.e. 5%). Pooling arrangements are by definition aimed at financing specific cost centres, such as technical assistance and drugs purchasing, and are usually limited to a small number of donors. Nevertheless, these schemes have provided a powerful impulse to rationalize resource allocation and to develop systems and standards accepted by partners and valid across the health sector, as outlined in the next mechanism.
Common procedures for the management of external funds are in place in numerous countries, including, in our sample, Bangladesh, Zambia and Mozambique (albeit limited to a few donors and small amount of funds, as described above). Donor use of national systems for managing funds constitutes a central component of the idealized SWAp (Cassels, 1997) . Common arrangements may govern tools for monitoring performance, procuring services and equipment, and managing funds, which are introduced by the recipient authorities and accepted by a group of donors. The improved administrative capacity of the public sector resulting from the imposition of standards acceptable to international agencies may have broader positive effects on the financial management of the state budget. However, it is not easy to reform existing systems and move towards one system which satisfies all donors (who themselves have different accounting mechanisms and systems on which they rely), nor to resolve the need of numerous donors to attribute their inputs with specific outputs. Experience to date suggests that the use of common procedures is the greatest challenge to implementing SWAps (Peters & Chao, 1998) .
What is an effective coordination mechanism?
In identifying the different mechanisms for coordinating external resources (Table 1) , four factors become clear. First, in many countries mechanisms have been introduced as part of an incremental process of trying out different approaches to controlling the different sources of inputs, both contingently (at the same time) and in sequence, with varying degrees of success. There is no one model. Second, some mechanisms function largely in the realms of consultation and concertation, predominantly coordinating inputs -in the sense that they provide opportunities for exchanging information and harmonizing policy on levels and purpose of aid. Others, however, are more directive and operational, and are used to manage inputs, through, for example, agreed financing, accounting, or monitoring systems, which focus on inputs, processes and outputs. The employment of specific instruments, such as 'baskets' of pooled resources, is an example of these more directive mechanisms. Third, it would appear, at least according to some criteria (Buse & Walt, 1996) , that many of the coordination instruments which have been established in the case study countries, have not excelled. For example, few are led by recipient authorities, few embrace all donors active in the sector or a large proportion of aid, few command sufficient authority to ensure participant compliance, and as a result, few actually dramatically enhance the overall effectiveness of aid deployment or ensure that donor contributions support recipient goals. Fourth, it is admittedly difficult to judge the effectiveness or impact of aid coordination, and attempts to do so may represent a second order solution in that they divert attention from asking more salient questions about what can be attained.
A number of fundamental problems and limitations arise when assessing the effectiveness of aid coordination. First, the mechanisms described above constitute a diverse set of activities which makes it difficult to evaluate them against any one set of criteria. Thus, for example, is a donor-only group that commands a high level of participation and generates positive outcomes in terms of operational coordination necessarily deficient because the government is not represented?
Alternatively, is a system of pooled resources that is patiently raising the capacity of local planners to manage resources inherently faulty because the resources of only a few of the many donors active in any one country are involved? Meaningful answers to these questions must be based on judgements which can only be made over time, and by observing how the particular mechanism is evolving and what other complementary mechanisms exist in the sector. In other words, aid coordination mechanisms must be assessed taking into consideration the broader context in which they operate.
Secondly, the past few years have witnessed a shifting of the goal posts as far as aid management is concerned. This has occurred in part because the notion of best practice has altered. Whereas the earlier benchmarks concerned themselves with the coordination of donors and aid per se (for example, the aim involved the harmonization of donor procedures or establishing multi-donor co-financed projects), discussions concerning the nature of the sector-wide approaches and support have altered expectations, with an increasing emphasis placed on the management of resources in the health sector more generally. As a result, the goal now involves the preparation of comprehensive sector strategies and expenditure programmes as opposed to the design of discrete projects with ring-fenced management units and budgets, or the use of national systems to manage resources as opposed to the use of special accounts for each donor. But the shift of standards has also occurred because of the conceptual difficulty of separating aid coordination mechanisms from the effectiveness of the system as a whole (Hildebrand and Grindle's five dimensions) when the very objective of coordination is to have a positive impact on system functioning and service delivery.
Using a classical health-system model of inputs, process, outputs and outcomes, Table 2 provides some ideas of where the impact of better management of aid might be seen. The model suggests that aid coordination which focuses only on the input level is unlikely to have a positive impact on the system as a whole, as effective processes are required to turn inputs into the outputs and outcomes that are ultimately desired. Thus, the impact of any additional external resources from which most countries could benefit, is often constrained by the poor management skills and processes in both the health system and donor agency offices, which result, among other things, in low rates of aid disbursement. At the same time, there are debates about the opportunity costs of the time and energy invested in general management systems (such as putting into place a new accounting and financial system) and the extent to which they detract from, rather than generate health care delivery improvements. Some express the view that such changes can only have a positive impact on the health system if at least as much weight is given to efforts to strengthen clinical management at all levels. Table 2 gives examples of how coordination may have some impact on the working of the health sector.
Clearly the table shows that there is little point in focusing on mechanisms for aid coordination or management alone, but that such mechanisms must be seen as part of strengthening the system as a whole. In other words, better management of aid requires that it is both a support to, and a product of, improved operational and clinical management within the health system as a whole.
Systemic issues which govern aid coordination: context and power
While laying down general principles for the management of aid is a helpful condition for moving towards better coordination and use of resources, it is affected by the unique circumstances of each country, which in turn influence that country's policy environment.
The uniqueness of context
Political and economic change has affected many countries during the 1990s, some more than others. The wave of political liberalization which swept across Africa from 1989 witnessed new governments taking control, marking the conclusion of years of instability and conflict in some countries (Mozambique, South Africa, and in Asia, Cambodia). The appearance of multi-party democratic systems was also a new experience in many countries, opening the policy environment to new actors, both within and outside government. Such changes have brought their own tensions for the management of aid: for example, between the old guardmany civil servants have continued to staff bureaucracies under new regimes -and newcomers who are often highly critical of, or opposed to, past policies. Consensus building has been fraught with problems at both macro and micro levels, exploding into disturbances at societal levels, as in Cambodia in 1997 and 1998; or in dismissal of civil servants or Ministers over particular issues. This has made aid relationships cautious and sometimes hostile.
Buse (this issue) speculates that a legacy of unaccountable military dictatorships and partisan and corrupt democracies in Bangladesh may account for the reluctance of donors to relinquish control of their funds to government counterparts. At times, donors have been prepared to work with governments or groups not considered legitimate by other donors, as shown by Lanjouw et al. in this issue. Countries that had been dominated by highly centralized, even command economic systems, abandoned them in favour of neo-liberal policies favouring the market. However, while many donors will have supported this policy transfer towards the market, it has not diminished the need for external aid. The overall economic outlook for most low-income countries remains uncertain, and health sectors are likely to continue to be under economic pressure. Clearly, although each country's experience is unique, this will affect the prospects for improvement in aid and resource management, and will govern how improvements take place.
Further, health sectors have also been subject to differing reforms which have affected the manner in which aid is managed, and again this is different for each country. As reforms get underway, so resistance is built up, or obstacles (structural and functional) have occurred to delay implementation. How countries have fared has been highly dependent on the status of the health sector: in some countries in the 1990s (South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia) the health sector has been protected, led and supported by high status, respected ministers. A new, interested, and capable permanent secretary in Bangladesh's Ministry of Health and Family Welfare facilitated a process to design a national health and population strategy which served as a building block for the introduction of a SWAp (Merrick, 1997) . But for many donors, the process of introducing reforms has been a slow and sometimes frustrating one.
While many of the same donors are present in each country, their attributes, interests and attitudes towards aid coordination differ from country to country. Donors are not active to the same extent in every country where they have a presence, and they form different coalitions and interests. In any Table 2 . Inputs, process, outputs and outcomes in aid coordination
System component Examples of areas of impact on the health sector
Coordinating aid inputs • increase in financial resources available to the health sector • increase in flexibility with which available financial resources can be used • increase in skilled personnel working within the sector • introduction of new ideas and ways of working • change in overall allocation of resources in the sector Using aid to strengthen • reduces duplication of donor activities with each other/with other groups processes
• increases standardization of staffing, procedures, and information • supports development of national planning processes and plans • provides direct contribution to the development of general management systems • provides direct contribution to the development of systems for monitoring and evaluating health system change Outputs of improved • improved use of available resources, e.g. as reflected in disbursement rates inputs and processes
• strengthened service delivery
Outcomes of improved • more appropriate patterns of utilization; higher levels of service coverage; lower levels of mortality and inputs and processes
• morbidity (i.e. indicators of good quality system products) one country, for example, they may form a 'like-minded' group, where they share ideas or values about aid or development in a particular sector, and where they may use this common approach in negotiations with a Ministry of Health. However, those same donors will not necessarily form the same group in another country.
The unpredictability and asymmetry of power
For many stakeholders, the prospects for coordination of aid are bleak because of the influence of personality and power. In spite of World Bank and OECD pronouncements that governments should coordinate donors, many observers report that coordination is dominated by one or several donors, and is more likely to take the form of consultation rather than operational coordination (Foltz, 1994; Brown et al., 1998; Okuonzi & Macrae, 1995) . Ministries of health are often perceived by donors to be relatively weak, with no coherent vision of how and where they want aid to fit into their plans for the health sector.
Power is an elusive concept, no less so when applied to the relationship between donors and recipients. As Wrong (1992) suggests, the form of power used in these relationships is probably authority, resulting from an intention to influence. It is unlikely that authority is exercised in the health sector through coercive means 6 but rather may take one of two forms: inducement, i.e. the application of positive sanctions (perks, additional resources) or negative sanctions (withdrawal of funds, or, more likely, not meeting pledged funds from donors), or competence, where power rests on the belief by one actor of the other's superior competence or expertise (an MoH could demonstrate competence by having good information systems, for example, or donor agencies might use competence through technical assistance). In rare cases, the relationship may be described as authority by legitimacy -where the 'power holder possesses an acknowledged right to command and the power subject an acknowledged obligation to obey' (Wrong, 1992) . This would be rare, but may occur in some continuing (ex-)colonial relationships. The final type of power is personal authority, where actors do what others want because they want to please them, simply because of their personal qualities. While this is probably relatively rare, on its own, in inter-relationships between recipients and donors, it may be one of the factors that facilitates cohesion among 'like-minded' donors.
However described, it is clear that power is asymmetrical, both between donors and between donors and recipients. Within the donor community, perceptions of differences in influence abound. The World Bank, for example, is often perceived by other donors (and also by recipients) to hold more sway with the government (although not always with the Ministry of Health). Mingst (1987) describes the African Development Bank's relationship with the World Bank as 'dependent', and says this is 'reinforced by the attitude of the African countries themselves who have viewed the ADB as one of the "last lenders" and one of the "last to be repaid" '. In many low-income countries, the growth in dependency on aid over the past two decades has undermined recipient government confidence: '. . .cash strapped governments, with weak technical capacity, tend to defer to donor expertise and rarely identify their own priorities for aid in an explicit fashion ' (Van De Walle & Johnston, 1996) .
Alternatively particular bilaterals or multilaterals are sometimes seen as having favoured access to government ministries. For example, WHO often has close relations with the MoH (Lucas et al., 1997) and in Bangladesh, although the Bank is clearly the most influential donor, USAID occupies a special niche as the largest and dominant external funder of family planning activities. It has been argued that USAID has not joined the consortium of donors in Bangladesh precisely because it feels that it has sufficient influence in policy circles without the encumbrance of coordinating its actions with other donors (Pavignani & Durão, 1997; Buse, 1999) .
Differences in power relations also make the management and coordination of aid more difficult. 7 The Ministry of Health may always be, or feel itself to be, in a weak position vis-à-vis the donors. In this situation, coordination may not be in its interests -and playing off one donor against another may be a way of keeping control over resources from a weak position. Indeed, some suggest that not only do ministry of health officials positively not support coordination, but some donor officials are unsympathetic to the idea, seeing it as unwanted control, diminishing their own flexibility to manoeuvre resources (Buse, 1999) .
Managing and coordinating external funds is further constrained by the different objectives held by the different actors. On the one hand, donors differ considerably in the extent to which they are motivated to give aid by historical, commercial and foreign policy objectives, and these objectives lead to their favouring certain countries over others, but also mean that 'The instruments of donor coordination are only exceptionally strong enough to maintain solidarity in the face of conflicting donor interests' (Killick, 1998; 174) . Donors are also subject to changing domestic political constituencies and accountability requirements. On the other hand, recipient governments, especially in low-income countries, are affected by systemic patronage and a desire to ensure stability in the face of economic and political uncertainties. These pressures may lead to conflicting expectations from aid and its management.
Finally, although few of these case studies explicitly explore the rationale behind donor or recipient attitudes towards participation in coordination, some evidence does emerge that agencies and governments seek to achieve more than the ostensible goals of coordination, namely, rationalizing aid. It would appear that interest in coordination is inextricably linked with influence and that coordination tools, and particularly leadership therein, provide the potential to enhance leverage over policy direction or resource allocation. Brown et al. (1998) , for example, demonstrate that USAID was primarily interested in learning more about aid coordination in West Africa so that it could 'identify ways in which USAID might . . . leverage more funds from other donors in an effort to achieve objectives shared by all agencies. . .'. The implication was that USAID hoped to use coordination to encourage other agencies to adopt USAID's goals. In Bangladesh, although donors provided a raft of reasons for joining the consortium, one of the two dominant themes to emerge was their view that membership would magnify their policy leverage. Conversely, those that did not join took the decision on the basis that membership would circumscribe their autonomy and that they wished to pursue their corporate agenda unfettered by the demands imposed by coordinated action (Buse, 1999) .
Shifting from aid coordination to resource management: are SWAps a rational or a fashionable answer?
While generally supported in theory, it is clear that the principles proposed by the OECD (1992), whereby the MoH (rather than donors) provides the leadership in the coordination of external resources, and multilateral and bilateral donors adhere to national priorities, are extremely difficult to adopt in practice. By the 1990s, experience in many lowincome countries had raised serious doubts about the feasibility and capacity of Ministries of Health in highly dependent countries to implement the sorts of systemic reforms necessary to take leadership and to develop national plans. While it was clear that a lack of coordination among donors made it difficult for governments to control aid, it was also the case that programmes perceived to be wellcoordinated but donor-driven often lacked recipient commitment, and therefore were only half-heartedly implemented (Jones, 1997) . The case study on Bangladesh, often held up as an exemplar in relation to coordination in the health sector through its World Bank-led Donor Consortium, is just such an example, with the Ministry of Health clearly dominated by the donors (Buse, this issue). Another study of countries in West Africa clearly demonstrated weak national institutional ability to coordinate external aid (Brown et al., 1998) , and others have pointed to rivalry and competition between donors (Nolke, 1992; Lanjouw et al., this issue) .
Attention thus turned to procedures and processes which would support governments to manage aid and to provide leadership in the sector. In the mid-1990s the World Bank stimulated a dialogue among donors about the need to develop a new approach to lending in order to 'obtain more sustainable results by empowering local stakeholders . . . and to assure a consistency and coherence of policy and investments' (Peters, 1996) . Envisaged as a broad sector approach, and referred to initially as sector investment programmes, the approach has been further refined, and adapted for the health sector as the SWAp -sector-wide approaches for health development (Cassels, 1997) .
'The SWAp is based on a new type of partnership, led by government, and involving a number of donor agencies and other groups in civil society. The approach has changed the tools used to promote sector reforms and manage development assistance. It has also raised new challenges in implementation and coordination and provided new ways to deal with long-standing conflicts over priorities of values, technologies, and processes.' (Peters & Chao, 1998) The SWAp represents an ambitious set of principles and attributes. Many are sceptical about the ability of SWAps to achieve what they set out to do (Cassels & Janovsky, 1997; Buse, 1999) , although there is considerable enthusiasm among donors for the concept, and many governments are discussing their introduction (Peters & Chao, 1998) . Central to the notion of a SWAp is the intention to reinforce national leadership, transparent decision-making and to build institutional capacity, thus shifting attention from mechanisms of coordination to a broader view of the policy environment, and how to support better management within it.
The country experiences presented here suggest that a range of financing instruments such as sector budget support, pooling agreements, 'basket' arrangements and even tied aid and special programmes can be incorporated within a SWAp -in other words, many of the experiences described in this issue's case-study papers have laid the foundation for the SWAps of the future. It is also likely, judging from research undertaken, that the evident lack of interest in coordination of aid evidenced in the literature and experience, is somewhat less evident in responses to SWAps. This may be because policymakers in both donor agencies and MoH are eager to support new ideas where old ones have failed, although on past experience, enthusiasm may falter as the implications of implementation become clearer.
It is possible that the SWAp may resolve an inherent contradiction presented by most aid coordination mechanisms; namely the problem of legitimacy in donor-driven arrangements. Whereas donors were often understandably reluctant to buy into arrangements established, and often controlled, by other (and sometimes competing) donors, the emphasis given by SWAps to government strategies, plans, expenditure programmes and management arrangements provides greater potential for coordinating external resources in one package managed by government, as well as strengthening government management systems. It seems that, depending on how they are introduced, recipients are positive about these potentials, because they legitimize their leadership and control. However, the cases of aid coordination and management presented in the following papers suggest that the prospects for improvements through SWAps are not assured. While it is encouraging to note that in many countries emphasis is being placed on the development of national processes and systems to manage resources, it remains to be seen if these can become sufficiently robust to inspire donor confidence and, once established, whether or not donors are willing to forego independent action in favour of collective arrangements. What the cases do suggest is that countries will manage their external resources more sustainably if they build incrementally on their experience over the past decades with a number of aid instruments that helped to manage coordination, rather than by assuming that a SWAp is a new blueprint for more effective aid management.
Endnotes
2 The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) supported the Southern Africa study in Malawi, Mozambique (additionally supported by the Swiss Development Corporation), South Africa and Zambia, and also the work in Cambodia; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Association of Commonwealth Universities provided some funds for the Bangladesh study. However, the papers represent only the views of the authors, and they alone are responsible for any failings in the papers.
3 Programme aid, which is primarily constituted of 'hard' currency given to the recipient government to sell in order to raise local funds, has more recently been oriented towards promoting wider reform. A key limitation of programme support is that in itself, it offers few opportunities for ensuring that support will lead to an improvement in sectoral performance. Therefore it demands a process that has a central concentration on policy and institutional issues. 4 Although it includes a short discussion of 'ear-marked budget support', because unlike generic budget support, it is generally treated and managed in the same manner as project aid.
5 This term is frequently applied to a shifting group of countries which may include the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Canada and Switzerland -that is, small, rich countries, often without colonial ties, and allocating a larger than average proportion of their wealth to support poor countries. 6 Coercive authority depends on compliance by force, where one actor is convinced by the others to be willing and capable of using force -and for which there are the 1990 geo-political examples of Iraq and Yugoslavia in Kosovo.
7 It should be noted, however, that the resource dependency school argues that differences amongst donors in terms of a series of characteristics facilitates coordination, as they cooperate with one another in an effort to optimize their individual comparative advantages (Mingst, 1987; Nolke, 1992) .
